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COMMENT
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION: REDACTION OF "EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT" WITHIN THE NORTH
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty-five years after the proliferation of United States legislation
to combat environmental degradation, focus is shifting to the international arena
in an attempt to protect the environment. The three parties to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement' ("NAFTA") have innovatively created an agree-
ment that truly empowers the people. The North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation2 ("NAAEC") allows private groups or non-governmen-
tal organizations ("NGOs") to submit "complaints" to enforce a party's environ-
mental laws? This aspect of the NAAEC is truly innovative; however, scholars
and commentators are not convinced of its effectiveness. Moreover, a section of
the NAAEC that defines "environmental laws" could nullify the entire agree-
ment because a party is allowed to exclude the "exploitation of natural resourc-
es" from the definition of "environmental laws."4 This is inconsistent with oth-
er language of the NAAEC, such as language found in the Preamble, the Obli-
gations, and the Levels of Protection.
For example, the Preamble affmns a party's right to exploit its natural
resources, yet seeks to ensure that the party's exploitation of natural resources
does not cause environmental damage to another member's environment.5 The
Objectives state that the purpose of the NAAEC is to foster protection of the
environment and promote sustainable development.6 The Levels of Protection
state that the "Part[ies] shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for
1. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 LL.M. 605 [here-
inafter NAFTA].
2. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
3. See id. at 1488.
4. ld. at 1495.
5. See id. at 1482.
6. See id. at 1483.
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high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve
those laws and regulations."7 Moreover, other innovations of the NAAEC such
as allowing NGOs to submit complaints are diluted because the Secretariat, in
determining whether to request a response from a country, shall be guided by
whether the submission alleges a harm to the "person or organization making
the submission."' The NAAEC could be a useful document for protecting the
environment and promoting environmental awareness; however, inconsistent
language within the document weakens its usefulness.
This paper examines the NAAEC and its implications for the environment.
The paper begins with a discussion of international cooperation regarding the
environment and then focuses on how environmental treaties have been imple-
mented and enforced. Section II addresses the role of the international commu-
nity in its relation to the environment. Section III discusses the NAAEC in de-
tail, focusing on the inconsistencies within the agreement itself. Section IV
examines the complaints submitted to the NAAEC's enforcement body9 and
illustrates how the inconsistent language leads to determinations that are con-
trary to the agreement.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Can the international community fashion agreements that are conducive to
environmental quality? How one responds to this question depends in large part
upon whether one believes that an international environmental treaty, or agree-
ment, can effectively coexist with international trade agreements that are de-
signed to enhance a global economy. Since 1972, the United States has partic-
ipated in 168 environmental agreements."
Can one say that after the influx of so many agreements, the world is a
much cleaner, safer, or better place to live? The implementation of most of
these agreements depends solely upon the ratification processes of the respec-
tive governments. Interestingly, a 1992 General Accounting Office Report found
that determining whether a signatory had implemented an agreement, while
itself a difficult question, did not even address whether an agreement had been
substantively effective."
Environmental concerns have increased dramatically in the last twenty
years.' Global environmental awareness among industrialized nations and
third-world countries has heightened. This has led to increased amounts of
international agreements relating to the environment. In 1972, more than 130
7. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 1488.
9. See id. Complaints are submitted to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. See infra notes
90-173 and accompanying text.
10. See U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., PuB. No. GAO RCED-92-43, INTERNAiTONAL ENVmONMENT: INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS ARE NoT WELL MoNrroRED 2 (1992).
11. See id. at 2-3.
12. See id. at 8.
[V/ol. 32:823
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nations participated in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment. 3 Since that conference, the United States' participation in environmental
agreements has grown dramatically from 44 agreements in 1969 to 88 by the
end of 1979." This number then increased to 168 by 1989." As one com-
mentator stated: "if someone thinks an issue is important, he or she wants a
treaty on the subject, much as each new nation seems to feel the need to estab-
lish an airline.' 6 Regardless of whether one favors the increased participation
in international environmental agreements or not, it is important to note that
participation in their formation alone does not make an agreement effective.
Development and implementation of environmental agreements in the
international arena depend on the national legislative process of the signato-
ries." Although there are methods of international law other than treaty imple-
mentation, 8 "treaties are now the most frequent method of creating binding
international rules relating to the environment."' 9 However, there are usually
no penalties or sanctions imposed on a country for failure to implement an
agreement negotiated in good faith.' Absent a penalty process for non-imple-
mentation, why would a national legislative body ratify a treaty that it perceives
as a detriment to trade?
Perhaps the use of customary international law is more conducive to estab-
lishing an international norm regarding the environment. The use of custom in
creating international law removes the burdens of treaty ratification and can
bring about universal application since acquiescence is adequate to bind even
non-signatories
The problem with relying on custom to enforce international environmental
principles is simply time. For a practice to develop into international law, the
international community must consider unilateral and multilateral agreements,
legislative actions and court decisions, and actions taken within the international
community.' It is also difficult to ascertain exactly when a custom has crystal-
lized into international law. The use of customary international law is still,
however, an important tool in protecting the environment.
A country that seeks a multilateral environmental agreement must first
build a consensus among the many states the agreement may affect.' One of
the most important issues facing a potential party-country is how the agreement
13. See id. at 9.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Michael A. DiMaggio, Environmental Law: When Does It Make Sense to Negotiate International
Agreements?, 87 AM. SoC'Y. INT'L. L. PRoc. 377 (1993) (statement of Joan E. Donoghue).
17. See U.S GEN. Accr. OFF., supra note 10, at 11. See also Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and
Environment Debate: In Search of A Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279,
1283 (1992).
18. PATRCIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND Tm ENVIRONMENT 9-31 (1992).
19. See U.S. GEN Acr. OFF., supra note 10, at 11.
20. See id. at 10.
21. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 18, at 15.
22. See id. at 16.
23. See id. at 15.
24. See U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., supra note 10, at 10.
1997]
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would effect it fmancially.' Parties are motivated by global economic con-
cerns when fashioning trade agreements that could perhaps envelop environ-
mental interests.' Moreover, some parties fashion environmental laws to give
themselves a competitive edge in the marketplace.' This could compel a na-
tion to enter into an agreement it would not have otherwise joined. Further-
more, there is an argument among some commentators that environmental
agreements are subjected to more stringent processes than other types of agree-
ments such as international trade treaties."
However an international environmental norm is effectuated, it is the spirit
of the agreement that should be controlling, not technical bureaucratese. The
spirit of the NAAEC can be extrapolated from the preamble and the objectives
expounded in the Agreement,29 as well as in other sections of the document."
However, as will be demonstrated below, the spirit of the document and the
decisions of the Council on Environmental Cooperation ("CEC")3' seem to be
at odds.32
III. THE NORTH AMERCAN AGREEMENT ON ENVmoNMENTAL COOPERATION
The NAAEC, completed in September, 1993,33 has been both praised34
and ridiculed. Some groups feared that an agreement of this nature would
promote industrialization over environmental concerns.36 Moreover, "environ-
mental groups fear[ed] that NAFTA [would] create incentives for corporations
to move environmentally-sensitive production to the least restrictive and least
regulated areas available."'37 The fear was that the parties to the Agreement
would relax environmental regulations in an effort to attract industry.38 Al-
though the NAAEC quieted the concerns of many environmental groups, 9 ap-
plication of its innovative language'has been less than effective.' Though con-
25. See DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 379 (statement of Peter H. Sand).
26. INTERNAToNAL ENvIRoNMENrAL LAW ANTHoLoGY 443 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds.,
1996).
27. See id. at 444.
28. See generally Goldman, supra note 17; but see Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L. J. 2039 (1993).
29. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1480-83.
30. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1483.
31. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1485-89.
32. See infra, section IV and accompanying notes.
33. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1480.
34. See Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environ.
mental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model For Future Accords, 25 ENVrh. L. 31 (1995). See also Freder-
ick M. Abbot, The NAFTA Environmental Dispute Settlement System as Prototype for Regional Integration
Arrangements, 1995 Y.B. INT'L ENvTh. L. 3 (1995).
35. See Some Environmentalists Fault Side Deal For What it Lacks Rather than Provisions, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1506 (Sept. 15, 1993).
36. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 34.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 34-35. See also Some Environmentalists Fault Side Deal, supra note 35, at 1506.
39. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 34-35.
40. See infra section IV.
[Vol. 32:823
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ceptually novel, the NAAEC possesses contradictory language needing clarifica-
tion.
The spirit of the NAAEC is encompassed in the Preamble which states that
the countries are "[c]onvinced of the importance of the conservation, protection
and enhancement of the environment in their territories and the essential role of
cooperation."41 The Preamble reaffirms the sovereign rights of members to
"exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and devel-
opment policies and their responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States
or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."'42 This language does noth-
ing to quiet the fears that the country with the least amount of environmental
protection will attract industry.
The parties to the NAAEC formulated objectives embodying very lofty
goals of cooperation in environmental protection and enforcement designed to
prevent pollution while promoting economic development.43 The language
should be read to give highest priority to environmental protection. However,
Article 3 of the NAAEC recognizes that each party has the right to establish its
own protection, stating that each party "shall ensure that its laws and regula-
tions provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to
continue to improve those laws and regulations."' This language suggests that
the purposes of the NAAEC are to promote enforcement and to thwart regulato-
ry degradation.4' There is no language, however, suggesting a party is abso-
lutely barred from attracting industry by undermining another party's environ-
mental regulations. In fact, recent determinations by the CEC have undermined
this language by finding that an effective enforcement does not entail new stat-
utes and regulations, but will only include a failure to effectively enforce cur-
rent laws through administrative actions.'
Other provisions further illustrate the NAAEC's objectives. Part Two of
the NAAEC states the obligations of the parties. These provisions provide that
each party shall publish in advance any measures it proposes to adopt;47 each
party shall use the appropriate governmental actions to enforce its environmen-
tal laws and regulations;' each party shall ensure that aggrieved individuals
within a party's jurisdiction have private access to remedies;4" and each party
shall ensure that an aggrieved party has procedural guarantees and that its ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings are "fair, open and equitable" and comport
with due process of law.5°
41. NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1482.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1483.
44. Id.
45. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 39.
46. See infra section IV and accompanying notes.
47. See NAAEC, supra note 2 at 1483.
48. See id. at 1483-84.
49. See id. at 1484.
50. See id. at 1484.
1997]
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The NAAEC has other unique aspects that raise concerns for some groups,
while alleviating the fears of others.5' In Article 8,5 the NAAEC sets up the
Commission For Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), 3 which receives com-
plaints concerning a party-country's environmental laws 4 The NAAEC has
been perceived as procedurally cumbersome because the complaints submitted
to the CEC regarding enforcement matters can be halted at many different stag-
es 5 Others have touted the NAAEC's importance by pointing out its novelty
in allowing private parties to initiate complaints before the CEC 6
The NAAEC states that all decisions made by the CEC shall be taken by
consensus, unless so specified, and that all decisions must be made public,
unless otherwise specified 7 The Council's functions are: to oversee the imple-
mentation of the NAAEC;5  to oversee the Secretariat;59 to address questions
and differences of the parties that may arise;' to approve the budget of the
CEC;6' and to facilitate cooperation between the parties.62 Incidentally, the
Council is to review the NAAEC four years after its implementation in order to
determine its "effectiveness in the light of experience."'
The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Director chosen by the CEC.1
The Executive Director serves a three-year term that may be renewed by the
CEC for one additional three-year term.s Moreover, the "position of Executive
Director shall rotate consecutively between the nationals of each party. ' The
Executive Director can also be removed for cause by the CEC.67
The main function of the Secretariat is to consider submissions from NGOs
or any person asserting that a member of the NAAEC has failed to effectively
enforce its own environmental laws.' Clearly, the parties to the NAAEC are
attempting to encourage active participation from its citizens in effectuating the
51. See generally Raustiala, supra note 34. See also David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment-Mak-
ing the Side Agreement Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COaMP. L. 603 (1995).
52. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1485. Article 8 establishes the Commission which is comprised of a
Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. See id.
53. See id. at 1484-90. The Council is the NAAEC's governing body and is comprised of cabinet-level
designees or their equivalents. See id. The rules and procedures governing the CEC are established by the
Council. See id. The agreement states that the Council shall convene at least once a year in a regular session
or at the request of any party, conduct public meetings when the sessions are regular. See id. If the sessions
are special, the Council shall decide if the meetings are public. See id. The Council may, if it so desires estab-
lish ad hoc committees or working expert groups. See id. The Council may additionally seek the advice of
NGOs or take such action in the exercise of its functions as the parties may agree. See id.
54. See U
55. See Baron, supra note 51, at 604.
56. See Abbot, supra note 34, at 7.











68. See id. at 1488.
[Vol. 32:823
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agreement.69 However, Article 14, discussing submissions on enforcement mat-
ters ("SEMs"), sets forth a rather stringent process for those submitting com-
plaints to the CEC.
A SEM is essentially a complaint made by a person or a NGO asserting
that a party-country as been derelict in enforcing its environmental laws. In
considering whether a NGO or a person has a viable submission, the Secretariat
should make a determination conforming with the requirements of Article 14.70
If the Secretariat determines that a submission has met the requirements of
Article 14.1 and 14.2, then it requests a response from the offending Party
based on the considerations of Article 14.3."1 This is the Party's opportunity to
prevent a factual record from being prepared. 72
After the NGO or private person has submitted all information and the
allegedly offending party has made any response, the Secretariat determines
whether a factual record is warranted.' The Council then decides by a two-
thirds vote whether a factual record will be required.74 Furthermore, if a factu-
al record is made, the Council will decide by a two-thirds vote whether this
factual record will be made public 5 The NAAEC states that in preparing a
factual record, "the Secretariat shall consider any information furnished by a
Party and may consider any relevant technical, scientific or other information:
(a) that is publicly available; (b) submitted by interested non-governmental
organizations or persons; (c) submitted by the Joint Public Advisory Commit-
69. See id. at 1485. Article 11, Secretariat Structure and Procedures, states that the Secretariat shall not
receive or seek instructions from any government or any other authority external to the Council. See id. at
1487. The Secretariat shall provide technical support to the Council. See id. The Secretariat shall provide to
the public information on where it can obtain technical advice with respect to environmental matters. See id.
Further, the Secretariat shall safeguard from disclosure information it receives identifying a non-governmental
organization or person maling a submission, if the person or organization so requests. See id.
70. See id at 1488. Article 14.1 considers whether the submission is in the proper language, clearly iden-
tifies the person or organization making the submission, provides sufficient information or documentary evi-
dence on which the submission may be based, indicates that the matter has been presented in writing to the
appropriate authorities of the Party, and shows that the group making the complaint resides in a territory of a
party. See id. Article 14.2 states "[if] the Secretariat determines that a submission meets the criteria set out in
paragraph 1, the Secretariat shall [additionally] determine whether the submission merits requesting a response
from the Party." Id. In deciding whether the submission is a valid complaint, the Secretariat shall be guided
by whether the submission alleges harm to the person or organization submitting the complaint, whether the
submission warrants further studies pursuant to the Agreement, whether private remedies have been pursued
in the Party's legal forum, and whether the submission is drawn exclusively form mass media reports. See id.
The CEC has placed Article 14 requirements on the Internet for easy access by private persons and NGOs at
<http://cec.org>.
71. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488. When the Secretariat determines that a response from the party
in question is necessary, it shall forward the submission and any other relevant information to the Party. See
id. The Party is then given the opportunity to respond within thirty days. In exceptional circumstances, the
Party is given sixty days. See id. The Party advises the Secretariat as to whether the submission is the subject
of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding. See id. If so, the Secretariat shall proceed no further. See
id. If the submission is not the subject of a judicial dispute or administrative proceeding, the party should
instruct the Secretariat as to whether the submission concerns a previous judicial or administrative proceeding
and whether there are private remedies yet to be pursued. See id.
72. See Baron, supra note 51, at 610.
73. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488.
74. See id. at 1488.
75. See id. at 1489.
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tee; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or independent experts."76 Even though
there is nothing in Part Three of the NAAEC suggesting what is to be done
with a factual record, some have suggested that merely publicizing the lack of
enforcement will prompt a government to address the matter, and increase en-
forcement procedures. 7
The submission requirements should not, however, be read too stringently.
Some argue that a conservative reading of these requirements would undermine
the credibility of the NAAEC. s These requirements, however, are the proce-
dural requirements. Assuming that a submitter presents a complaint that satisfies
the procedural aspects of Article 14, the hurdle remains of submitting a com-
plaint that alleges a party-country has substantively failed to effectively enforce
its environmental laws.
How the phrase "effectively enforce environmental laws" is to be interpret-
ed is the crucial determination. The objectives of the NAAEC were to foster the
protection and improvement of the environment.79 Should that mean that a par-
ty-country is to refrain from diminishing the substantive laws and regulations
from their body of laws? The NAAEC defines environmental law as "any stat-
ute or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which
is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human
life or health .... ."' It excludes from this definition "any statute or regulation
thereof, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is managing the
commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of
natural resources."'"
This latter definition is inconsistent with the Preamble and the Objectives
stated within the NAAEC. Thus, if the NAAEC was designed to ensure that a
party-country could not dilute its environmental laws in order to attract busi-
ness, the latter definition suggests that a legislature concerned more with eco-
nomic growth than with environmental protection could simply designate a new
statute or regulation as an exploitation of natural resources, which would there-
fore exempt the new statute or regulation from the requirements of the
NAAEC. 2 The Secretariat has taken this position, determining that "failure to
enforce" will be construed as the acts or omissions of agencies and officials
charged with enforcing environmental law, and not the acts of the legislative or
executive branches of government. 3
Article 5 of the NAAEC illustrates the CEC's reasoning and supports the
contention that new laws and regulations are not considered a failure to effec-
76. Id.
77. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 37 (quoting Bob Davis, U.S. Urges Curbs on Power of Panels on
North American Environment, Labor, WAL. ST. J., Mar. 10, 1993 at AS).
78. See Baron, supra note 51, at 608.
79. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1483.
80. See id. at 1495.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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tively enforce environmental laws." The language of this Article is directed
specifically at laws already in force." It does not speak of the degeneration of
environmental policy the NAAEC was designed to prevent.86 Rather, the Arti-
cle suggests only that it may be invoked if a country is not enforcing an active
environm ental law." Therefore, a conservative legislature can dilute a party-
country's environmental policy by passing a new law without offending the
NAAEC's Article 5 provisions, yet the new law could be contrary to the objec-
tives of the NAAEC.
Law makers and commentators have suggested that the interpretation of the
NAAEC should reflect its central purpose which is to "protect and enhance
environmental quality."8 Moreover, lawmakers in the United States have sug-
gested that the impetus of the NAAEC should also be considered in determining
how the NAAEC should be read. 9 If the CEC is unwilling to interpret the
agreement in toto, then the objective of the NAAEC will be violated on a regu-
lar basis. Party-countries will be able to curtail environmental policy to attract
industry by simply passing new laws and regulations, which is exactly what the
NAAEC was supposed to prevent.
Incidental to the submissions by NGOs is Part Five9° of the NAAEC
which establishes the manner in which the Parties will deal with each other in
the event that one Party-country asserts that another Party-country is not effec-
tively enforcing its environmental laws.9 Part Five does not specify what en-
tails a "persistent pattern." Perhaps a persistent pattern is derived from factual
records developed as a result of the submissions of NGOs or private persons?
On the other hand, the definition of "persistent pattern" could be formulated by
the Parties in requesting a consultation where a complaining country asserts that
84. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1483-84. This article states, inter alia, that
with the aim of achieving high levels of environmental protection and compliance with its environ-
mental laws and regulations, each Party shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and regula-
tions through appropriate governmental action, subject to Article 37, such as: (a) appointing and
training inspectors; (b) monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations, including
through on-site inspections; ... (e) issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement
procedures; (f) promoting environmental audits; ... (j) initiating, in a timely manner, judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its
environmental laws and regulations;... (1) issuing administrative orders, including orders of a pre-
ventative, curative or emergency nature.
Id. (emphasis added). Further,
each party shall ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are





88. Baron, supra note 51, at 605 n.14.
89. See id.
90. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1490-94.
91. See id. Article 22 states that "[a]ny Party may request in writing consultations with any other party
regarding whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce its
environmental law." Id. at 1490. Moreover, if a consultation has been requested, a third party that considers it
has a substantial interest in the matter is entitled to participate in the consultation provide that it has delivered
in writing a notice to the other parties. See id. The Article also states that the parties shall make a good faith
effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter. See it.
1997]
9
Coatney: The Council on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of Effective
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:823
the offending country has failed to effectively enforce an environmental law. If
the former definition is utilized, the environment will continue to suffer since
the CEC has determined that a "failure to effectively enforce" does not entail
new laws and regulations, which would mean a new law or regulation could
never demonstrate a "persistent pattern." If the latter definition prevails, howev-
er, the Parties perhaps will be more effective than citizen submissions in ensur-
ing that the spirit of the NAAEC is followed.
IV. SUBMISSIONS OF ENFORCEMENT MATrERS:
COMPLAINTS SUBMrrLD TO THE NAAEC
Since the inception of the NAAEC, the Secretariat has made determina-
tions on a total of five submissions made by NGOs and private persons. Of the
five submissions, in only one has the Secretariat recommended a factual record
be prepared.'
A. Submissions by Private Persons and NGOs
1. SEM-95-001
The first submission ("SEM-95-001") was made the Biodiversity Legal
Foundation against the government of the United States,"3 alleging that the
United States government was not effectively enforcing the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 ("ESA"). 94 It is rather ironic that the first complaint was made
against the United States because many individuals believed the NAAEC was to
be utilized primarily against Mexico.' President Clinton had signed into law
the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions For the Depart-
ment of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995."
The Submitters alleged that the Act contained an unrelated amendment, later
known as the "Hutchison Rider" or "ESA Moratorium."' The Fish and Wild-
life Service, which oversees the ESA, determined that the Rider affected its
enforcement of the ESA's listing provisions98 in two ways. First, the Rider
prohibited the agency from making "final determinations" for species or critical
92. See NAAEC Registry of Enforcement Matters Submission 9601, Comit6 para la Protecci6n de los
Recursos Naturales, A.C., <http://cec.org/english/citizen/index.html> [hereinafter "SEM-96-001".
93. See NAAEC Registry of Enforcement Matters Submission 9501, <http://ce.org/english/citizen/
9501sub.htm> [hereinafter "SEM-95-001"].
94. See id. See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1994). For the view that the ESA does not give enough
protection to endangered species, see Tzong-Bing Tsai, One Step Further Towards Biodiversity Conservation,
30 TULSA L3. 657 (1995).
95. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 35. See also Bureau of National Affairs, supra note 35, at 1506.
96. See id. See also Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions For the Department of
Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73.
97. See SEM-95-001, supra note 93.
98. See id. "mhe Secretary [of Interior] shall make a finding as to whether the petition presents sub-
stantial scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may be wan-anted... the
Secretary shall promptly publish each finding under this subparagraph in the Federal Register." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(3)(A)(l) (1994).
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habitat designations for the remainder of fiscal year 1995. 9 Second, the Rider
rescinded $1.5 million from the budget allocated to the program and prevented
it from offsetting the loss from other programs."
The Submitters emphasized that the Rider should not be construed as an
amendment to the ESA, arguing it was instead a suspension of the ESA's en-
forcement provision,'"' in violation of the NAAEC provision requiring each
party to "effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through
appropriate governmental action.' '" °" The Submitters, in relying on this conten-
tion, cited a decision from the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona. 3 Additionally, they noted that suspension of the ESA was for pure-
ly economic reasons, quoting the legislative history."'4 The distinction between
amendment and suspension was critical to the determination issued by the CEC.
The Submitters tailored their first argument to Article 5, which required
each party to "effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations
through appropriate governmental action.""'5  They noted that Article
45(2)(a)(iii) supplied a definition "environmental law.""'6 They also contended
that Article 3'07 applied because the Rider suspended enforcement instead of
amending or modifying the ESA. The Submitters concluded that the CEC
should prohibit any suspension of enforcement of an environmental law or
regulation by any branch of government."'8
The Secretariat, however, did not accept any of the Submitters arguments.
The Secretariat determined that because the alleged failure to enforce an envi-
ronmental law was the product of competing legislative mandates and not the
product of actions taken by an agency, it must consider whether the "failure to
effectively enforce" could result from two contradicting statutes."'9 The Secre-
tariat determined that Articles 14 and 15, when read in conjunction with other
99. See SEM-95-001, supra note 93.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1483-84.
103. See SEM-95-001, supra note 93 (citing Silver v. Babbitt, 68 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 1995)).
104. See SEM-95-001, supra note 93. The Submitters quoted Senator Hutchison, the author of the Rider,
who stated that the Rider declared a time-out on the enforcement of the ESA's listing provisions so that "silly
things will not happen." Id. Senator Hutchinson also noted that the Rider was designed to ensure that
bait fish and golden checked warblers and jaguars and salmon that are running the wrong way in a
stream will not take precedence over the rights of farmers and ranchers who have toiled on their land
and who are working for living and providing the food for citizens to eat in this country.
Id. (citation omitted). The Submitters also noted that other senators spoke on the Rider as well. Senator
Gorton stated that "a mere finding of threatened or endangered status for any species subject to listing auto-
matically results in restrictions of the use of property, restriction in economic activity, and in cultural, social
and community disruptions." Id. (citation omitted). Senator Craig stated: "We have heard rhetoric on this
floor for the last 5 years that the [ESA] is not working. It is costing hundreds of millions of dollars of lost
economy and lost jobs, and we have done nothing about it." Id. (citation omitted). Senator Domenici stated.
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articles of the NAAEC, suggest that a failure to enforce environmental law
pertains to an administrative agencies or officials charged with implementing
laws and regulations."' It determined this while finding that "there is little to
support the notion in Article 14.1 that the word Party is restricted to include
only the executive functions of agencies or departments, or that the term should
mean anything other than 'government' in a broader sense, including its sepa-
rate branches.' ' .
This distinction was critical because the Secretariat determined that a "fail-
ure to effectively enforce" pertained only to actions taken by an agency, con-
cluding that the Department of Interior had not failed to "effectively enforce"
the ESA."' It reasoned that "while not conclusive, the provisions of Article
14 are most logically triggered when a failure to enforce is brought about by
administrative shortcomings rather than legislative mandates."". Moreover,
Article 14.2 asserts that private persons or NGOs must pursue private remedies
before filing a submission."' By passing a moratorium on the ESA listing
process through the Rider, Congress effectively removed any private remedy for
the Submitters, and the only way to change that fact was through legislative
amendment. The Secretariat stated that:
[t]he absence of a legal remedy further underscores the difficulties associ-
ated with evaluating legislative actions under Article 14. Here, the
Submitters have lodged a submission immediately after the U.S. has spo-
ken through the voice of its elected representatives. Article 14 was not
intended to create an alternate forum for legislative debate."'
Interestingly, the Secretariat read Articles 14 and 15 in conjunction with
certain articles of the NAAEC" 6 while failing to read them in conjunction
with the Preamble," 7 the Obligations," the General Commitments," 9 and
the Levels of Protection."2 When read in conjunction with these sections, it is
apparent that the Rider contradicts the spirit of the NAAEC. The NAAEC was a
response to fears that NAFTA would cause companies to move environmentally
sensitive production to countries with the least environmental regulation.'
This first determination was dangerous in allowing the legislature to decimate
an environmental law for a more lax statute, or for no statute at all. Additional-
ly, the determination allows a country to reduce its environmental protection for





114. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488.
115. SEM-95-001, supra note 93.
116. See id.
117. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1482.
118. See id. at 1483.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Raustiala, supra note 34, at 34.
[Vol. 32:823
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In rejecting the Article 3 argument offered by the Submitters, the Secretari-
at recognized the right of each Party to set its own level of environmental pro-
tection and then somewhat whimsically stated that the "[Plarties [should] further
commit to maintaining high levels of environmental protection."'2 The Secre-
tariat also noted that the "application of the Rescissions Act has suspended for a
stipulated period of time the implementation of certain provisions of the
ESA.'"" How can the CEC assert that a suspension of an important piece of
environmental legislation, such as the ESA, is also a commitment to maintain-
ing high levels of envirmonmental protection? This determination must be
viewed as both a setback in the environmental movement and a rejection of the
spirit of the NAAEC. THe Secretariat has in essence nullified the importance of
the NAAEC by determining that a Party can diminish environmental legislation
through the ballot box, which can still attract industry to environmentally sen-
sitive areas.
2. SEM-95-002
The second submission ("SEM-95-002") was filed by a variety of environ-
mental groups led by the Sierra Club. The complaint first alleged that the provi-
sions of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster
Assistance and Rescissions Act ("Rescissions Act")24 resulted in failure to
effectively enforce all applicable environmental laws by eliminating private
remedies for salvage timber sales." The Secretariat rejected this argument,
ruling that an actionable failure to effectively enforce an environmental law
could not be found in an action taken by the legislature."ss
The Submitters further contended that the Rescissions Act contained a
Rider that suspended enforcement of U.S. environmental laws"v in violation
of the NAAEC." The Rider allowed a "massive logging program on U.S.
public lands,"'29 which would "promote a cheap supply of timber from federal
lands for timber industries."''  The Submitters sought preparation of a factual
122. SEM-95-001, supra note 93.
123. Id.
124. Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995).
125. See SEM-95-002, supra note 83.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. The Submitters felt that this was a violation notwithstanding the SEM-95-001. The
Submitters stateh
It is important to recognize that the logging rider did not emerge as free-standing legislation. If it
had, it would have been referred to congressional committees with jurisdiction to hold hearings, anal-
yses, committee votes, and public reports. It also would have been more visible to the public, U.S.
trading partners, and Members of Congress. Instead, the logging rider was tacked onto a popular
budget-cutting and disaster-assistance measure that few Members of Congress wanted to vote against.
The rider was not the subject of full congressional scrutiny, which normally includes public hearings,
committee review, and committee and floor votes on substantive legislation. Even the committees
with jurisdiction over forestry and forest reserves were denied the opportunity to review fully and
comment on the rider ....
Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. It is important to remember that the NAAEC was designed to prevent "incentives for corporations
1997]
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record, pursuant to Article 15.Y Alternatively, the Submitters sought prepara-
tion of a record prepared under Article 13.2
The Submitters were concerned that the Rider would eviscerate the only
mechanism ensuring federal environmental laws to be enforced by federal agen-
cies charged with managing public forests. They stated that this Rider abolished
the mechanism which enforced federal environmental statutes providing for the
management of public forests. 3 3 Moreover, the Rider would not be subject to
administrative revew,'34 which is "[olne of the cornerstones of our
democracy."'35 Because the Submitters believed these actions amounted to a
failure to effectively enforce environmental laws, they presumed that the
NAAEC would be the proper vehicle to combat this legislation."3
The Submitters relied upon the language of Article 5 to bolster their argu-
ment that the Rider was a failure to effectively enforce an environmental law.
They asserted that each of the Submitters have "legally recognized interests
under U.S. law to protect endangered species and natural areas from which their
members obtain aesthetic, recreational, and avocational benefits."'37 By pre-
cluding these members from seeking administrative review, the Rider thus
to move environmentally sensitive production to the least restrictive and least regulated areas available."
Raustiala, supra note 34, at 34. The Submitters quoted the author of the rider in support of their contention
that this was a violation of existing laws. The author stated:
[The rider] means, for example, that the Secretary cannot be sued for violation of the Clean Water
Act, the provisions of the National Forest Management Act concerning species' viability, unsuitabili-
ty, or consistency with the resource management plans, or the jeopardy or take standards of the En-
dangered Species Act. Furthermore, as indicated, a [timber] sic sale can be offered that does not
comport with the resource management plan, or interim guidelines, or management directives ...
Finally, a sale can be offered even if it would be barred under any decision, injunction, or order from
any federal court.
Id.
131. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
132. See id. at 1487-88. Article 13 states that:
The Secretariat may prepare a report for the Council on any matter within the scope of the annual
program. Should the Secretariat wish to prepare a report on any other environmental matter related to
the cooperative functions of this Agreement, it shall notify the Council and may proceed unless,
within 30 days of such notification, the Council objects by a two-thirds vote to the preparation of the
report. Such other environmental matters shall not include issues related to whether a Party has
failed to enforce its environmental laws and regulations.
Ida (emphasis added). The Submitters asserted that the complaint raised the prospect that the U.S. Congress
was starting what amounted to a 'race to the bottom' with regard to environmental enforcement. See SEM-95-
002, supra note 83. The Secretariat did not even broach the issue in its determination. See id.
133. See SEM-95-002, supra note 83. The Submitters asserted that the logging rider effected enforcement
of environmental laws in two ways. First, the logging rider suspended enforcement of most U.S. environmen-
tal laws with respect to what is known as salvage logging. See id. Further, the logging rider suspended en-
forcement with respect to non-salvage logging. See id.
Congress defined salvage timber sale as
any timber sale: for which an important reason for entry includes the removal of disease -or insect-
infested trees, dead, damaged, or down trees, or trees affected by fire or imminently susceptible to
fire or insect attack. Such term also includes the removal of associated trees or trees lacking the
characteristics of a healthy and viable ecosystem for the purpose of ecosystem improvement or reha-
bilitation ....
Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(a)(3), 109 Stat. 194, 241 (1995) (emphasis added) (to be codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 1611 note). Salvage logging is the removal of downed dead trees. This Act ignores the
fact that these downed dead trees are an intricate characteristic of a healthy and viable ecosystem.
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failed to effectively enforce environmental laws. They also argued that Article 6
of the NAAEC 3s was applicable because the Rider eliminated the "most ef-
fective (and often only) judicial remed[y] for violations of environmental
laws. ,39
The Submitters further noted that Article 45(2)(b) excluded laws which
exploited natural resources. However, they argued that Article 45(2)(a)'(iii)
applied to any provision of the law in which the primary purpose was the pro-
tection of the environment.'" The Submitters stated that the principle target of
the Rider was the suspension of enforcement of environmental statutes such as
the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act, the
primary purpose of which was environmental protection.1' They believed a
proper reading of Article 45 would require "[t]he primary purpose [to be] deter-
mined by reference to each statutory or regulatory provision, rather than to the
law as a whole."' 4 This reading mandates the Rescissions Act be interpreted
as a failure to effectively enforce environmental laws. Although the Secretariat
acknowledged that the Rider addressed exploitation of natural resources,1 43 it
determined that the submission alleged a failure to enforce environmental laws
specified in the logging rider which met the definitional requirements of Article
45.144
The Secretariat again determined that the facts did not suggest a failure to
effectively enforce an environmental law or regulation; rather, the statute must
be read in conjunction with the entire corpus of the law. 5 The Secretariat
stated that it "considers [that] enactment of legislation which specifically alters
the operation of pre-existing environmental law in essence becomes a part of
138. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1484. The section entitled "Private Access to Remedies" states:
1. [E]ach party shall ensure that interested persons may request the Party's competent authorities
to investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws and regulations and shall give such re-
quests due consideration in accordance with law.
2. Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a par-
ticular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial proceedings for the
enforcement of the Party's environmental laws and regulations.
3. Private access to remedies shall include rights, in accordance with the Party's law, such
as: ... (b) to seek sanctions or remedies such as monetary penalties, emergency closures or orders to
mitigate the consequences of violations of its environmental laws and regulations; (c) to request the
competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce that Party's environmental laws and reg-
ulations in order to protect the environment or to avoid environmental harm; or (d) to seek injunc-
tions where a person suffers, or may suffer, loss, damage or injury as a result of conduct by another
person under that Party's jurisdiction contrary to that Party's environmental laws and regulations or
from tortious conduct.
Id.
139. SEM-95-002, supra note 83.
140. Id. See also NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1495.
141. See SEM-95-002, supra note 83.
142. Id.
143. See id. This statement by the Secretariat is rather problematic in that it could foreshadow future
determinations. Although exploitation of natural resources is an important and legitimate function of govern-
ment, the Secretariat may have unwittingly established a precedent that would allow a conservative legislature
to simply designate a new law or regulation as an exploitation of natural resources and thereby circumvent the
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the greater body of laws and statutes on the books."'" Moreover, this would
be true "even if [the] pre-existing law is not amended or rescinded and the new
legislation is limited in time."'47 Therefore, the logging rider must be read in
conjunction with pre-existing environmental law, and if the latter law or regu-
lation waives, exempts, or modifies the former, the latter will prevail.'"
The Secretariat then dispensed with the Article 6 component of the com-
plaint.'49 It determined that the Rider did not provide facts supporting an in-
ference of a failure to enforce.' The Secretariat determined that the submis-
sion was "prospective in nature, alleging anticipated but unrealized enforcement
consequences.'' Hence, the Secretariat determined it was not provided with
sufficient details to review the submission because there was not a factual basis
to determine upon which environmental law was not being enforced.' The
Secretariat again made formalistic determinations based on individual articles
within the NAAEC, and refused to examine the document in toto and approach
the determinations based on the spirit of whole agreement.
3. SEM-96-001
In the third complaint submitted to the CEC, the Secretariat determined
that a factual record should be prepared.' The Complaint was submitted by
environmental groups in Mexico, led by the Comit6 para la Protecci6n de los
Recursos Naturales A.C.'54 The groups alleged that the Mexican government
was failing to effectively enforce an environmental law by "not requiring the
presentation of an Environmental Impact Assessment in connection with the
construction and operation of a port terminal and related works located in
Cozumel, Quintana Roo."'55 The Mexican government responded by raising
procedural and substantive inadequacies. 1 6 The Secretariat determined that a




149. See id. Article 6 provides for Private Access to Remedies. The Submitters alleged that the Rider
included suspension of citizen enforcement provisions through additional limitations on administrative and
judicial review. See id. See also supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. See also NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488.
The Secretariat may consider a submission from any non-governmental organization or person as-
serting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law, if the Secretariat finds that
the submission: ... (c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submis-
sion, including any documentary evidence on which the submission may be based.
Id.
153. See SEM-96-001, supra note 92.
154. See id. Author note: The complaint and the response from the Mexican government can be found at
http://cec.org; however, these documents only appear in Spanish. A summary of the submission and the re-
sponse by the Mexican government is provided by the CEC at http://cec.org/cgi-shl/dbml.exe. The Secretariat
managed to reduce twenty pages of submission and response to less than a two-page summary. It is impera-
tive that the CEC remedy this situation so that interested persons can read the documents in toto and come to
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and the government of Mexico's important contentions in this matter. 157 Fur-
ther, the Secretariat noted:
the importance and character of the resource in question - a portion of
the magnificent Paradise corral reef located in the Caribbean waters of
Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may
not have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire
legal standing to bring suit in some civil proceedings in North America,
the specially public nature of marine resources bring the submitters within
the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the NAAEC.'58
Although it is laudable that the Secretariat arrived at this conclusion, the
Secretariat offered no guidance to subsequent Submitters. Also, the Secretariat
was willing to overlook the fact that the Submitters "may not have alleged the
particularized, individual harm" in this submission, yet were unwilling to exam-
ine future harms alleged by the Submitters in SEM-96-001 concerning the log-
ging rider.'59 If the NAAEC is to live up to its billing as a valuable interna-
tional legal regime,"6° the Secretariat must give more explicit guidance
through its determinations.
4. SEM-96-002
The fourth complaint submitted to the CEC was by a private person
against Canada.161 It asserted that the Canadian government failed to effec-
tively enforce its environmental laws resulting in the pollution of wetland areas
which impacted the habitats of fish and migratory birds." The Submitter also
instituted judicial proceedings against the province of Alberta that possibly
would effect the outcome of any CEC decision."6 The Secretariat therefore
decided to take no further action in this matter, pending the outcome of the
judicial proceeding in Canada.1"
5. SEM-96-003
The fifth complaint made against a NAFTA-party was again by a Canadian
environmental group against the government of Canada." The Friends of the
Old Man River (FOR) were concerned that the Canadian authorities were fail-
ing to "apply, comply and enforce the habitat protection sections of the Fisher-
ies Act, and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act [hereinafter
157. See id.
158. Ld. (emphasis added).
159. See id.
160. See Raustiala, supra note 34. See also Baron, supra note 51.
161. See NAAEC Registry of Enforcement Matters SEM-96-002, <http://cec.orglenglishlcitizen
9602det2.htm> [hereinafter "SEM-96-002"].
162. See id. at 2.
163. See id.
164. See id. See also NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488.
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"CEA.A"],''  the primary purpose of which was environmental protection,
and not resource management.67 FOR acknowledged the possibility that there
were private remedies available to them in specific cases where fisheries habi-
tats were damaged. Moreover, FOR admitted that there were private remedies
available in specific cases to force the Canadian government to comply with the
CEAA. They explained, however, that they were not aware of private reme-
dies that would compel the Canadian government to comply with the CEAA in
general."°
Again, the Secretariat ruled that the complaint did not meet the Article 14
requirements. It determined that although the Canadian government had re-
sponded to the "specific" failure to enforce an environmental law, the submis-
sion focused on the governments "general" failure to enforce an environmental
law, which had not been communicated to the government. 7° Accordingly,
the Secretariat informed the Submitters that they had thirty days to "provide the
Secretariat with a submission that conforms to the criteria of Article 14(1) of
the Agreement.'' Once again, the spirit of the Agreement was ignored, and
the decision was based on an overly technical reading of this so-called "proto-
type for regional integration arrangements."'"
B. Analysis
The NAAEC contains dynamic language indicative of the Parties' commit-
ment to environmental protection. However, the CEC has taken an overly for-
malistic approach to the application of the Agreement, thus circumventing the
Agreement's substantive spirit. The Preamble states that the parties recognize
the importance of the environmental goals of NAFTA, including enhanced
levels of environmental protection. Further, the Preamble emphasizes the impor-
tance of public participation in conserving, protecting, and enhancing the envi-
ronment."r The submissions, discussed above, question the ability of the pub-
lic to participate in global environmental protection. Moreover, the CEC has not
offered any guidance to aid a party in its formulation of policy or to private
persons in remaining vigilant observers of the environment.
The NAAEC contains the appropriate checks and balances to ensure the
consideration of environmental issues. For example, Article 14(1)(d) dictates
that the Secretariat should consider whether the submission "appears to be
166. Article 14 Submission by Martha Kostuch, Vice President, Friends of Old Man River, to the Secre-




169. See id. The specific example that FOR offered as evidence of Canada's failure to enforce was the
general failure of the Government of Canada to apply, comply with and enforce the Fisheries Act and the
CEAA.
170. See SEM-96-003, supra note 165. See also NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1488.
171. Id.
172. See generally Abbot, supra note 34.
173. See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1482.
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aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry."'' Article
14(1)(b) states that one objective is to "promote sustainable development based
on cooperation and mutually supportive environmental and economic poli-
cies." 75 Lastly, Article 3 states that the member parties recognize "the right of
each party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection...
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations." '76 The
Secretariat should consider the articles in toto instead of examining only a few
articles that necessitate stringent, narrow determinations.
The NAAEC should not be applied in a hyper-technical manner or be
construed to suggest that a party-country can simply enact a new law and not
be in violation of the NAAEC. The Agreement was designed to ensure that a
party-country could not diminish its environmental laws in order to attract busi-
ness. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "a
treaty will be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose... including its preamble and annexes. ' ' "n
Thus far, the determinations made by the CEC have ignored these princi-
ples. Moreover, the CEC has suggested that laws designed to exploit or harvest
natural resources are not applicable. Impliedly, a conservative legislature, more
concerned with economic promotion than with environmental well-being, could
simply designate a new law as an exploitation of natural resources and further
circumvent the spirit of the NAAEC.
V. CONCLUSION
The NAFTA parties have agreed to protect the environment while promot-
ing sustainable economic growth. The Agreement sets up a Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, which hears complaints made by private persons
and non-governmental organizations. The CEC has investigated five complaints
made by NGOs to date and has only recommended that a factual record be
prepared for one complaint. Its determinations thus far have been inconsistent
with the spirit and intent of the Agreement. In order to satisfy the intent of the
Agreement, the CEC will have to reformulate its reasoning. The NAAEC can
be a useful document in protecting the environment and for promoting envi-
ronmental awareness. To date, however, there is inconsistent language within
the document that weakens its usefulness.
174. Id. at 1488.
175. See id. at 1483.
176. Id.
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The spirit behind the NAAEC can be promoted by the CEC by interpreting
the document in toto. The CEC should look to all these articles of the
agreement in making its determinations, instead of making its determinations
based on technical legalese.
Jason Coatney
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